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1. Introduction 
 
After the downfall of the military government in 1991, the transitional government of 
Ethiopia committed itself to implement the stabilization and structural adjustment 
program with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. The objective of the program was 
to remove cost-price distortions, improve market related incentives, promote private 
enterprises and exports, and liberalize the economy and to reduce the role of the public 
sector in the economy. The a private led competitive economy operating under a free 
market and prudent fiscal and monetary policy environments was optimistically expected 
to emerge from this. 
 
The practical experience of the last decade of the adjustment program, however, revealed 
that the expected results could not be obtained. This study tries to explain such failure 
from theoretical point of view and the practical experience of East Asian countries. To 
this end the paper is structured as follows: following this introduction is the 
macroeconomic policies and programs undertaken during 1992/93-2000/01 to encourage 
the private sector in particular and business activities at large. The third part reviews the 
performances and problems of the private sector during the same period in the country. 
Part four is devoted to review the practical experience of successful East Asian countries 
and the fifth part tries to highlight donor agencies' Private Sector Development (PSD) 
agenda and the link to poverty reduction. The final part concludes the study and draws a 
lesson for Ethiopia. 
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2. Macroeconomic Policies and Programs for Private Sector Development 
[1992/93-2000/01] 
 
i. Fiscal Policy 
 
With in a disciplined macroeconomic framework, fiscal policy was focused on the 
provision of basic services and infrastructure while at the same time reducing the overall 
fiscal deficit.  The key objective of the fiscal policy was to strengthen public sector 
savings, with the twin aim of making available additional domestic and foreign reserves 
to develop the private sector and of supporting productive public investment (particularly 
in infrastructure and human capital) to benefit the private sector. 
 
The focus on reducing fiscal deficit for private sector development is for the mere reason 
that the private sector considers the sustainability of the fiscal adjustment when making 
investment decisions.  If deficits are perceived to be unsustainable, then the private sector 
will expect future tax increase or money creation (inflation tax), which in turn affects its 
investment decision. 
 
Therefore, several measures including rationalizing public expenditure, limiting the 
number of zero-tariff related items and import exemptions, broadening the tax base, 
introducing rental income tax, reforming interest income and capital gain taxes, reducing 
the maximum custom tariff rate, and etc have been taken.  These measures are believed to 
improve revenue performances while at the same time raising expenditures only 
moderately and thus allowing for a reduction in the consolidated overall deficit. 
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ii. Monetary and Financial Policies 
 
The monetary policy in the period under consideration had been formulated in such away 
as to ensure the money supply grows at a rate consistent with targets for inflation, 
economic growth, and the BOP, while allowing reasonable credit growth to meet the 
needs of the productive sectors, particularly the private sector.  To improve the 
mobilization and allocation of financial resources, monetary policy had also been targeted 
at ensuring a positive real interest rate for both depositors and lenders.  Moreover, to 
improve the efficiency and soundness of the financial system in creating a conducive 
environment for private sector development, the policy included institutional and 
regulatory reforms. 
 
In these lines, several measures had been taken.  These include liberalizing the interest 
rate and allowing them to be market determined, allowing for the establishment of private 
commercial banks and insurance companies, replacing direct monetary policies with 
indirect ones and establishing a modern legal and institutional framework for the National 
Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).  In trying to liberalize the interest rate, currently only the 
minimum deposit rate is set by the NBE.  And with regard to the indirect monetary policy 
instruments, Treasury bill auctions were introduced in January 1995. 
 
iii. External Sector Policies 
 
The external sector policies had been targeted at achieving a viable balance of payments 
position over the medium term, promoting exports, removing cost-price distortions and 
integrating the country in to global markets for goods and services.  In pursuit of these 
objectives, import tariffs had been progressively reduced, and the payment and exchange 
regulations for foreign trade in goods and services have been increasingly liberalized. 
 
With regard to the exchange rate, the Birr value was made to devalue by 58.6 percent in 
USD terms to Birr 5.0 per USD in 1992.  Then after the fortnight foreign exchange retail 
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auction was introduced in 1993.  This was again replaced by a weekly retail auction in 
1995 and a weekly wholesale auction in 1998, respectively. 
 
To further promote and diversify exports, a number of measures including the import 
duty drawback system, establishment of foreign exchange bureaus, etc were also taken. 
 
 
iv. Other Policies 
 
In addition to the reforms discussed above, the government envisaged several other 
measures to promote private sector development.  These include, inaction of investment 
and labor codes, eliminating restrictions on renting land, and other measures that tries to 
simplify the licensing and regulatory frameworks applicable to business and limiting 
bureaucratic discretions.  Moreover, almost all sectors with the exception of military and 
telecommunication are opened for the private sector to invest. 
 
The government also accelerated the pace of liberalization in domestic markets and 
replaced administratively fixed price systems with a competitive market based system.  It 
also seeks to develop a flexible-transparent and efficient labor market.  Public enterprise 
reform and privatization were also taken.  Up to 1998, about 175 enterprises were 
privatized. 
 
3. Performances and Problems of the Private Sector in Ethiopia [1992/93-
2000/01] 
 
i. Performances   
 
Even though there is no comprehensive information on the participation of the private 
sector in the country, a glance review based on the information obtained from the 
Ethiopian Investment Authority, Central Statistical Authority and some other studies is 
presented below to shed light on the performance of the sector. 
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Agriculture is remained to be the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy. It covers about 
45% of GDP and over 90% of the total export and it provides employment for more than 
85% of the total population of the country.  Private farm holders are believed to produce 
more than 95% of the agricultural output and cultivate more than 95% of the agricultural 
land of the country (Getachew, 2000). 
 
Moreover, about 1,396 agricultural projects, which worth 4,571.8 million Birr domestic 
private investment capital were approved during 1992/93 - 2000/01.  Of these, about 636 
projects, which worth 1,704.5 millions of Birr commenced operation during the period 
[Tables 2 and 3]. 
 
As discussed in Getachew (2000), trade mainly domestic, is the second largest economic 
activity for the private sector in the country.  According to the information obtained from 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, there were about 4,607 active traders and 3,862 
traders, which obtained license, in foreign trade in the year 1998/99.  The share of the 
private sector in the country's export trade, which was 16% of the total export in 1990/91, 
stood at 74% in the year 1997/98. 
 
The Central Statistical Authority manufacturing survey, 1996 and 1999 revealed that the 
share of gross value of production of the private manufacturing to total gross value of 
production of manufacturing increased from 9.5% in 1993/94 to 25.8% in 1997/98.  
Similarly the share of private sector manufacturing value added at market price increased 
from 6.1% in 1993/94 to 18.6% in 1997/98 [Table 1]. 
 
Table 1: No of establishment, gross value of production and value added at market 
price of the manufacturing sector. 
No. of 
Establishments 
Gross value of production Value added at market price  
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1993/94 330 499 66 379,091 4,010,703 9.5 126,841 2,070,152 6.1 
1997/98 607 762 79.7 1,650,353 6,393,206 25.8 511,119 2,741,798 18.6 
Source: Central Statistical Authority 
 
As can be seen in Tables 2&3, industry is the largest sector that the private sector have 
got investment approval and commenced operation during the period 1992/93 - 2000/01. 
 
Table 2:  No and investment capital of domestic private investment projects approved 
(new and expansion) by sector, 1992/93 - 2000/01. 
                      
  
 
Sector   Investment (1992/93-2000/01) 
      No. of Projects 
Investment Capital 
In mn. of Birr 
Industry    2,630 16,571.13 
Agriculture   1,396 4,571.80 
Real Estate Development 448 7,444.19 
Hotel and Tourism   374 1,804.57 
Education Service   202 1,678.19 
Health Service    176 1,381.66 
Construction   262 5,660.46 
Trade    224 1,127.40 
Transport and Storage Services 67 1,339.86 
Mining and Quarrying   46 467.94 
Electricity Generation 6 113.09 
Other Businesses   251 1,806.66 
Grand Total   6,082 43,966.95 
                  Source: Computed from Ethiopian Investment Authority Data 
 
Table 3: No. and investment capital of domestic private investment projects (new and 
expansion) which have commenced operation by sector, 1992/93 - 2000/01. 
  Sector   Investment (1992/93-2000/01) 
      No. of Projects 
Investment Capital 
in mn. of Birr 
Industry    902 4,250.60 
Agriculture   636 1,704.50 
Real Estate Development 20 54.70 
Hotel and Tourism   96 251.10 
Education Service   22 297.70 
Health Service    21 90.90 
Construction   37 1,452.90 
Trade    36 151.80 
Transport and Storage Services 14 955.50 
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Mining and Quaring   9 167.90 
Electricity Generation 0 0.00 
Other Businesses   10 89.90 
Grand Total   1,803 9,467.50 
                 Source: Computed from Ethiopian Investment Authority Data 
 
The private sector is also involved in financial institutions like banking, insurance and 
micro-finances.  The information obtained from the National Bank of Ethiopia (as of 
January, 2003) showed that 6 private commercial banks, 8 insurances and about 21 
formal micro-financing institutions have been operating in the country. 
 
ii. Problems  
 
As we have seen in the above section the private sector has shown interest to participate 
in almost all opened sectors following policy changes.  However, despite a bulk of 
macroeconomic adjustments taken under the umbrella of SAP, the performance of the 
sector is remained to be poor.  As we can see in Table 4 below, only 22% of the approved 
capital or 1,803 projects out of 6,082 approved projects have been commenced operation 
in the year 1992/93 - 2000/01. Two reasons can be can be given for this. First, the 
policies envisaged under stabilization and SAP have mixed impacts on PSD. In other 
words, some of their policies are pro-private sector development while others tend to 
discourage it.  For instance, deregulation of the domestic market and good 
macroeconomic policy management would encourage the private sector development 
through creating competition among firms and business confidence to investors on the 
macro-economic stance of the country in question.  However, the other policies like 
opening up of doors for imports and banishment of the state from the productive sector of 
the economy may discourage and curtail private sector involvement. 
 
Secondly, private sector development constraints are more severe at the meso and micro-
levels than at macro-level and hence emphasizing at macro level would not be effective 
without addressing issues at the meso and micro levels. Several studies on problems of 
private sector in Ethiopia (Dejene and Ibrahim,1998; Addis Ababa Chamber of 
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Commerce, 1998 and Ethiopia and Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 2002) for 
instance, revealed that access to land and credit, lack of entrepreneurship skill and 
infrastructure, market difficulties, tax related problems, etc are the major constraints.   
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Domestic Private Investment Projects, which have commenced operation as 
percentage of approved projects in the period 1992/93- 2000/01 
  Sector   No. of Projects Investment Capital in mn. Birr 
      Approved operation percentage approved operation percentage 
Industry    2,630 902 34 16,571.13 4,250.60 26 
Agriculture   1,396 636 46 4,571.80 1,704.50 37 
Real Estate Development 448 20 4 7,444.19 54.70 1 
Hotel and Tourism        374       96         26   1,804.57     251.10         14 
Education Service   202 22 11 1,678.19 297.70 18 
Health Service    176 21 12 1,381.66 90.90 7 
Construction   262 37 14 5,660.46 1,452.90 26 
Trade    224 36 16 1,127.40 151.80 13 
Transport and Storage 
Services 67 14 21 1,339.86 955.50 71 
Mining and 
Quarrying   46 9 20 467.94 167.90 36 
Electricity Generation 6 0 0 113.09 0.00 0 
Other Businesses   251 10 4 1,806.66 89.90 5 
Grand Total   6,082 1,803 30 43,966.95 9,467.50 22 
Source: Computed from Ethiopian Investment Authority Data 
 
a) Land Related Problems 
 
The Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No.80/1993 confirms that land in the 
country is owned by the government and it ensures that the government shall provide the 
right to the private sector to use land on a long-term lease basis, ranging from 50 to 99 
years.  Different studies like, Dejene and Ibrahim (1998), Addis Ababa Chamber of 
Commerce (1998) and Ethiopia and Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce (2002) found 
out that acquiring land is the prime treat to private investment in the country. 
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Problems related to land include, high cost of land, very short payment period, interest 
that should be paid in the payment period, lengthy procedure to acquire land, and etc.  
According to the result of an unofficial study, the cost of land as percentage of investment 
capital on average is 25 for industry, 29 for business and 2 for health and education. This, 
however, excludes different administrative cost in the process of acquiring land and the 
interest payment.  So, if such costs were added, the percentages would have been larger 
than the reported ones.  The price of land in Addis Ababa during 1995/96 – 1998/99 
varied from Birr 205 to Birr 4,300 or on average Birr 1,521.35 per Meter Square 
(Ethiopian Investment Authority, 1999). 
 
Although the new investment code confirms that an approved investment shall get land 
with in 60 days of the application period, one unofficial survey based study showed that 
acquiring land is very lengthy, taking on average, 36 months for industry, 24 months for 
business and 10 months for social sectors.  The existence of a chain of organizations and 
committees to be visited, the requirement of large number of redundant and unrelated 
documents, lack of transparent procedure, absence of centralized land administration, 
limited capacity of the responsible organizations and lack of coordination and 
information flow among the concerned bodies are the major ones, which consume this 
lengthy time. 
 
b) Finance 
 
Finance is the core element of any investment project.  Most investors relay on bank 
finance for their investment projects.  Access to bank finance is not, however, easy for 
Ethiopian investors.  One of the major problems associated with finance is limited and 
huge collateral requirement.  Currently, the only acceptable (by banks) collateral 
properties are buildings under urban municipalities and vehicles registered by the Road 
Transport Authority of Ethiopia.  So, any investor who wants to get bank loan should own 
such properties.  This problem is more severe for those who would like to invest in the 
agriculture sector as their buildings or any fixed assets in their farm area are not 
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acceptable.  Moreover, it discourages small-scale enterprises, which is again the nature of 
most private sector enterprises in the country. 
 
The collateral requirement is also very large ranging from 125% to 400% and there is 
problem of under valuation of collaterals by banks (Ethiopia and Addis Ababa Chamber 
of Commerce, 2002).  Moreover, there is problem of pledging leased land as collateral in 
spite of the Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No.80/1993, which states "... any 
person who acquires the right to hold urban land on lease may transfer or pledge such 
right or contribute in the form of a share to the extent of the rent paid". 
 
The findings of the various regional and sectoral consultative forums on private sector 
development (Ethiopia and Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 2002) and other studies 
show that the process of getting bank loan is very long and bureaucratic.  Thus, the time 
that takes to get land and bank loans would increase the costs of investment projects 
considerably. 
 
There is also a problem of extending medium to long-term loans; banks are very reluctant 
to extend loans for long and medium term development activities and they tend to 
exclude small borrowers and concentrate on their wealthy clients that are creditworthy 
(Dejene and Ibrahim, 1998).  
  
c) Infrastructure 
 
Supply of efficient infrastructure facilities such as electricity, telephone, water and road 
play important role for private sector development.  However, those institutions, which 
are concerned with the provision of physical infrastructure in the country, have weak 
capacity. On top of that there is no coordination between these institutions and the 
institutions that are concerned with the provision of land.  As a result land allocators 
provide land irrespective of the presence or absence of infrastructure in the area.  This 
poses several problems on the private sector development.  In addition, the costs of 
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telecommunication and electricity are very high and discourage the private sector 
performance. 
 
Absence of export processing and industrial zones, quality control and marketing and 
distribution are also the major obstacles to the performance of the private sector. 
 
 
 
d)  Tax Related Problems 
 
Although the government had taken a remarkable reform on taxes, problems still arise on 
tax and tax related issues.  These include, inefficient tax administration system especially 
random imposition of taxes in some areas, corruption, with holding taxes very high for 
most business activities, unpredictability of tax regulations, high rates of capital gain 
taxes, difficulty in getting duty draw backs and higher taxes on imported inputs (Ethiopia 
and Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 2002).  The business community also 
complains that most of the tax related incentives by the government are not applicable or 
bureaucratic if applicable. The higher tax rate (45%) on house rent income and the 
absence of tax holidays discourages investors from involving in real estate development. 
 
e) Market Difficulties 
 
Market difficulties are the other obstacles that threaten the private sector development in 
Ethiopia. Externally, dumping or subsidized cheap imports from Asian countries resulted 
in cease of most business activities in the country.  Domestically, the private sector is said 
to face unfair competition from party affiliated companies, which are believed to be 
favored by government, at least by government officials.  Of course the government 
repeatedly denounces this pledge.  But these party owned companies are challenging the 
private sector in almost every sector; trade, construction, transport, publishing, 
advertising, agriculture input supply and manufacturing.  It is clear that, even though the 
government may not favor them directly, senior government officials and politicians 
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being decision makers and board members of these companies by itself erodes the private 
sector business confidence.  And at the same time service-giving institutions may not 
treat equally the private sector request and the request of these officials. 
 
Other problems related to market include, rampant contraband activities, poor market 
information, etc. 
  
 
f) Absence of Clear Industrial Policy 
 
From a historical perspective of the contemporary world, it is axiomatic that economic 
development is invariably directly proportional to industrialization.  In this high-tech, 
information and industrialization era, it is the industrial products, which are more 
profitable and gain more private sector interest.  The private sector, to participate, 
however, needs government leadership and assistance and clear policy that is targeted to 
develop the sector.  In Ethiopia, there is lack of distinctive policy that formulates a 
strategy for the development of the country's manufacturing industry and hence incentive 
schemes and priorities that should be given to the sector.  This discourages private sector 
participation in the sector in particular and in the economy at large. 
 
The other problems include lack of information and advisory services, lack of 
entrepreneurship development programs and absence of public-private partnership. 
 
4. East Asian Experience 
 
A lesson from successful East Asian countries tells us that governments were not only 
political leaders but also economic and entrepreneurial leaders.  Given the low capacity 
and diminutive nature of their private sector at the early stage of their development, the 
governments decided to play a leading role in the economic transformation (Kim, 1995; 
Sakong, 1980 and 1
up
 info).  The leadership was in such a way that the state guided the 
business towards the nation’s goal of economic development through directing resources 
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and providing the economic conditions in which business could flourish.  In short, it is 
said that the government was considered to be a guide and the private sector as a 
producer (1
up
 info). 
 
This leadership role of the governments led to the emergence and survival of private 
conglomerates, for instance Chaebol in Korea and Ziabatsu in Japan, which contributed a 
lot to their fastest economic growth and which still dominated the world market. 
Government activities to this end included; participating directly in business activities, 
designing and implementing favourable and sound industrial and trade policies, planning 
a chain of selected strategic sectors and allocating resources and designing incentives for 
them, assisting the private sector in technological and entrepreneurial developments and 
preparing forums in which the private sector discussed with the government. 
 
Since the private sectors at the early stage of their development were considered to be 
less experienced and capital-poor that lacked the wherewithal to develop several critical 
industries, governments established and owned business enterprises (Kim, 1995; 1
up
 info; 
Shim,…).  Their enterprises were critical for private sector development through 
providing forward and backward linkages, introducing new and expensive technological 
ventures and teaching by doing. 
 
East Asian governments’ effort in structurally transforming their economies from 
backward and subsistence agriculture based to modern industrialization helped their 
private businesses to strengthen.  Because it is evident that the private sector is willing to 
participate and stay in profitable activities where there is a growing demand for the 
products both in the international and domestic markets.  The World Bank and IMF, 
however, recommend African countries to specialize in primary agricultural and raw 
material sectors, as these sectors are the comparative advantage of those nations.  Where 
as the future of exporting these agricultural and raw material products is becoming 
gloomy as their world demand and prices are persistently declining. In this regard Stein 
(1999, ----) noted the following: 
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“Advances in biotechnology and material sciences are leading to synthetic for 
primary products such as Vanilla and Sugar. Products such as cocoa and palm oil are 
also being challenged by western firms as they undertake genetic research to develop 
outright synthetic substitutes or alternative methods of production. On the demand 
side, the usage of resources like copper is being replaced by optical fibers or 
microwaves putting downward pressure on prices”. 
 
So, what the government of Ethiopian has to learn from this is that creating and 
generating new capacities, norms, incentives and regulations for industrialization so as to 
attract private capital and build a private-led competitive economy.  The pursuit of 
industrialization through agriculture policies only cannot structurally transform the 
economy as the expected saving and foreign exchange earning from agriculture is being 
difficult to be obtained where the futurity of these products is unpromising.  Moreover, 
industry cannot spontaneously evolve from agriculture without well-designed industrial 
policy. 
 
Trade policy in East Asia at the early stage of their development was focused on shifting 
from a strategy of import substitution towards export- oriented policy.  This does not, 
however, mean that they discarded import substitution activities.  Indeed, the latter went 
along with the export-led strategy (Lim, 1995; Kim, 1995; and Brautigam, 1995).  It is 
written in 1
up
 info as “The government [Korean] combined a policy of import substitution 
with the export-led approach”. While liberalizing essential imports such as raw materials, 
energy, capital and intermediate goods, the policies of these countries remained to be 
highly restrictive on agricultural and manufactured products, which were considered 
import-substitutable and/or consumer goods (Kim, 1995; Alam, 1989; Okita, 1980).  The 
more rapid export growth in these economies was made possible through protection of 
domestic industries until they become matured and different incentive structures creating 
a strong bias towards exports. Such activities would help the private sector to become 
strong and competitive and further attracts new entrants.  
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In Ethiopia, however, the existing diminutive and infant enterprises are exposed to 
external predators under the umbrella of SAP's free trade policy.  This resulted in the 
stagnation of private sector business activities.  For instance, in the year 2001 more than 
20 shoe factories in Ethiopia were reported to be closed and most others reduced their 
capacity and labor force due to the cheap Chinese shoes, which crossed the free border of 
the country. 
 
The main feature of planning in East Asia was to target few sectors of the economy in 
successive plans that were expected to perform well in international markets and granting 
special incentives to those who enter the international market (kim, 1995; Okita, 1980; 
Brautigam, 1995).  Saburo Okita, who was involved in the process of Japan’s post-war 
reconstruction as a planner and as an economist, has put Japan's industrial policy as 
follows: 
  "The policy was, carefully select industries, prevent ruinous competition at the infancy 
stage, nurse them up to a competitive stature, and then expose them to outside 
competition. … Here western nations frowned up our methods, but we felt it was the 
right policy for the late-comer to pursue" (Okita, 1980: 96-97). 
The policies of other countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia more or less 
resemble that of Japan (Kim, 1995; Brautigam, 1995 and Edwards, 1995). 
 
Mechanisms used by the governments to encourage private sector evolvement in the 
selected industries included trade protection, tax incentives, subsidies, labor market 
adjustments, and other industry specific assistances (1
up
 info).  For instance, as indicated 
in the planning documents of Korea during the 1970s, the primary goal of planning for 
industrial priorities was seen as providing incentives to the private sector at a level 
compatible with resource needs and availabilities.  Japanese and Taiwan governments 
also provided different incentives for their private sectors (Nafziger, 1995, Brautigam, 
1995).  In Japan, the government imported spindle spinning machines, 1878-79, to sell on 
lenient credit terms to private enterprises in the textile industry, Japan's leading export 
sector at the time (Nafziger, 1995:63). 
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In general, resources were directed to the targeted areas by government institutions that 
were deliberately built for this purpose.  Specialized banks that provide short and long-
term credit to the private firms, for example, were deliberately established.  Furthermore, 
the establishment of free trade zones and simplification of customs procedures made East 
Asian exporters to conduct business smoothly (Korean Ministry of Cultures and 
Information, 1982: Brautigam, 1995). 
 
The roles of the states in entrepreneurial and technological developments were also 
impressing.  Supports were made through education, research and development, 
importing technologies for the private sector on credit basis and so on (Jones and Sakong, 
1980; Natziger, 1995 and Shim,…).  The private sector, on the other hand, gives high 
value to entrepreneurial skill development.  Profits were made to reinvest and/or saving 
as the governments provides incentives (profit tax exemption) for such activities.  
Empirical studies on entrepreneurship in Africa indicate, however, that African 
businessmen, unlike those in East Asia, rarely save their profit to reinvest.  They rather 
tend to value highly consumption and real estate expenditure.  Further more, they lack 
experience in managing and coordinating a production process with specialized work 
tasks and machinery (Nafziger, 1995:64). 
 
Finally, an essential component of East Asian private sector development was the public-
private partnership forums.  Deliberate councils were established to organize forums for 
exchange of ideas between the two. 
 
In Japan, the government and the private sector have engaged in policy dialogue through 
two types of councils: functional or thematic councils and industrial councils.  These 
councils provide a forum for government officials and representatives from the business 
labor consumer, and academic communities as well as the press, to discuss policy and 
marketing issues (African Development Bank,1997: 97). 
 
In Korea and Singapore also, governments and the private sector relations have been 
close and cooperative.  The most important channels of communication in Korea, for 
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instance, are through monthly export-promotion meetings of economic ministers and top 
business leaders (African Development Bank, 1997:97). 
 
Most importantly, the views and comments of the private sector about markets, policies 
and plans are considered critical components of policies.  The governments usually invite 
the business community and professional associations to submit their views on policy 
documents and plans before going in to implementation stages (African Development 
Bank, 1997 and Kim, 1995). 
 
In general, East Asian economic take-off in the 1960s and 1970s was undertaken under 
the government interventions and their leading roles.  Such intervention is not, however, 
to be taken as indicative of either blindness or anti-private sector business bias.  
Interventions were structured so as to promote private sector development, in supportive 
of entrepreneurial endeavor and with a bias towards expansion of projects (Jones and 
Sakong, 1980). 
 
 
5. Donor Agencies, Poverty Reduction and the PSD Agenda 
 
The failure of most of the 1960s and 1970s state-led development and import substitution 
policies resulted in shift of developmental thinking of multilateral donor agencies, the 
World Bank and IMF.  Hence, in the 1980s these institutions followed adjustment lending 
with conditions on general policy reforms (World Bank: 2002).  These policies were 
macroeconomic stabilization and opening up of economies to trade and foreign 
investment. 
 
The focus was on shifting the role of the government from business activities in to 
macroeconomic management and leaving the former to the private sector.  Hence, the 
World Bank tended to emphasize on PSD in addition to stabilization and openness.  The 
need for stabilization and trade liberalization arised to create economic incentives for 
PSD. 
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Later on the bank understood that the response of the private sector to these 
macroeconomic trade policy measures could not be as expected and tried to expand the 
PSD agenda to emphasizing on microeconomic and institutional reforms (World Bank, 
2002:25).  Particularly, when the World Bank and IMF shifted their agenda from 
structural adjustment program and stabilization to poverty reduction strategy PSD has 
been considered as critical.  This is because first, private markets are the engine for 
productivity growth and thus create more productive jobs and higher incomes.  Secondly, 
complementary to government roles in regulation, funding and provision, private 
initiative can help provide basic services that empower the poor by improving 
infrastructure, health and education – the conditions for sustainable improvements of 
livelihood (World Bank, 2002: i). 
 
Hence, the recommendations for extending the reach of markets include – enhancing the 
investment climate, and direct support to firms in the form of finance and advisory 
services, which should be aligned with market forces and not to be subsidized.  The 
components of enhancing the investment climate include sensible government system, 
infrastructure, competition, sound financial system, stable macroeconomic environment 
and open to trade. 
 
Improving basic service delivery by the private sector can also be achieved through 
allowing the private sector participation in infrastructure and provision of social services. 
 
All in all, the Bank focuses on four PSD related interventions 
- improving the investment climate 
- privatizational and concessional type arrangements 
- direct assistance to enterprises 
- social funds 
 
These PSD interventions are also shared among other bilateral and multilateral donors 
(Gibbon and Schalpen, 2002; OECD, 1990; AFDB, 1997). 
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Despite their claim that they are emphasizing on PSD and poverty reduction in 
developing countries, their policies and strategies do not seem to address the real 
problems of PSD in these countries.  First and foremost, they still insist on 
macroeconomic management and trade openness for PSD.  However, the response of the 
private sector in these countries to such policies could not be positive.  For instance, 
Magarinos (2001:2) argued that ‘… the private sector is not responding positively to 
macroeconomic stability, and structural adjustment policies and programs”.  The African 
Development Bank 1997 annual report also agrees with this, even though its justification 
shows that it still insists on the importance of such policies on PSD
1
.  The reasons for 
such failure are, however, as discussed before the mixed impacts of the SAP policies and 
the less attention given to problems at the meso- and micro-levels, which are infact, the 
major problems for PSD. 
 
Secondly, they argue that markets alone will do the job of facilitating the private sector to 
contribute to poverty reduction.  And thus, the government should not intervene in 
business activities and its role should be limited to governance, macroeconomic 
management, and domestic security and ensure that markets are operating freely.  The 
practical experience of East Asian countries, however, tell us that governments play a 
leading role in promoting private sector development and economic development at large 
through its direct intervention to business activities.  It is difficult to attain economic 
development by putting the burden of all the business activities on the back of the low 
experienced and capital poor private sector. 
 
Thirdly, they recommend avoiding subsidy, which was found to be very important in the 
successful private sector development process of East Asia.  Finally, they focus on 
encouraging private sector involvement in infrastructure and social service provision and 
view this as the final goal of PSD. And hence they recommend privatization of public 
enterprises involved in these activities.  The argument is that, the poor will have access to 
                                                 
1 
The justification for such poor response of the private sector is given to be the uncertainty over the 
sustainability of the reforms. 
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these services and hence contribute to poverty reduction.  However, there is a more 
dynamic gain from PSD if infrastructures can be viewed as a means to encourage private 
sector activities in other profitable sectors such as industry and other service sectors.  
This is because the private sector needs have access to infrastructure to engage in 
profitable business activities and productions for export, which may perhaps be the best 
route for growth and poverty reduction.  Moreover, private firms are mostly reluctant to 
engage in sectors with large sunk costs and high-risk markets such as infrastructure. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks and Drawing Lessons for Ethiopia 
 
This study tries to review the macroeconomic policy measures taken in Ethiopia and their 
respective impacts on private sector development in the 1990s.  Upon reviewing, the 
study concludes that the bulk of macroeconomic adjustments taken under the umbrella of 
SAP have not encouraged the private sector performance.  In trying to find out the 
reasons from theoretical literatures, survey based studies, and practical experiences, the 
study argues that; first, the policies envisaged under SAP have mixed impacts on PSD.  In 
other words, some of the policies have positive impacts while the others have pervasive 
negative impacts.  Secondly, the constraints for PSD are severe at the meso and micro 
levels and hence emphasizing at macro level would not be effective without addressing 
issues at the meso and micro levels. 
 
Thus, the study calls for government intervention in business activities in a way that 
promotes private sector development, in supportive of entrepreneurial endeavor and with 
a bias towards expansion of business activities.  On the other hand, putting all the 
business activities or the role of coordinating and running the productive sector of the 
economy on the back of infant, less experienced and capital-poor private sector that lacks 
the wherewithal to undertake such activities has not proven to be effective practically. 
 
In particular, the government has roles to play at different levels of the economy to 
encourage the private sector and to attain sustainable development.  At the international 
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level the government has a role to play in finding markets for exports, making trade 
negotiations, negotiating with donors about the attached preconditions and attracting 
foreign capital. 
 
At the macro-level the state has to make the financial, fiscal, exchange rate and trade 
polices favourable and in supportive of domestic business activities.  In addition, efforts 
have to be made by the government to build infrastructure and good governance. 
 
At the meso and micro level the government has a role to play, perhaps very important 
for PSD, in building institutional infrastructure such as intermediate financial institutions, 
R & D institutions and training institutions, and in supporting the private sector for access 
to technology, entrepreneurship development programs, market information, etc. 
 
There is also a need to have public-private partnership forums for exchange of views and 
ideas on plans, policies and marketing issues.  The recent document on poverty reduction 
and strategy paper of the government acknowledged the need for such forums.  It, 
however, seems to limit the role of the forums to be a means to mutual understanding (as 
a partner) and trust.  But, there is a more important gain if the government considers the 
concerns of the private sector as critical policy components.  There is nothing to be 
gained from giving a hearing after the government already decides on the implementation 
of the policies and plans. 
 
Finally, from the private sector’s side there is a need to give emphasis on 
entrepreneurship development, striving for technology and reusing profits for business 
expansion rather than using for high-valued consumption expenditure and real estate 
developments.  It is also important for PSD if the business community develops a 
business discipline i.e. complying with the fiscal, legal and regulatory requirements of 
commercial activity. 
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